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INTRODUCTION
Suppose the police suspect Winston of possessing child pornogra-
phy on his computer. Acting on that suspicion, authorities secure a
warrant to seize and search Winston’s computer and all other digital
storage mediums at his residence. However, when combing through
the files stored on Winston’s devices, the police find no trace of the
illicit images.
To ensure that the search is thorough, law enforcement officers
begin to open separate programs installed on the machine, search-
ing for documents hidden within the applications. One program they
open is Microsoft’s OneDrive,1 which provides a list of files that are
stored in Winston’s cloud storage account. The files, however, are
not actually present on his computer’s hard drive, or on any other
storage medium he possesses. The police do this despite the fact
that their warrant specifies only their right to search the contents
of Winston’s physical drive. Regardless, they can see the files avail-
able for download and they seize them anyway. Later, when check-
ing the downloaded data, the police do not find any evidence of child
pornography, but they do find documents incriminating Winston of
another crime. As it turns out, Winston does not traffic child porn,
but he was in fact committing bank fraud.
This seemingly small exploration might appear innocuous on its
face, but it carries broad implications for search and seizure law in
a digital environment. The warrant gave the police license to search
files on Winston’s computer and the storage media he owned, but in
this instance they did not find incriminating data there. Instead, the
police discovered evidence on a remote platform that Winston’s com-
puter could access, but the evidence was not stored on his actual
computer.
The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution protects citizens
against warrantless searches and seizures of their “homes, papers,
and effects.”2 Nevertheless, this guarantee is not unconditional; the
1. For the purpose of this example, assume that this is the version of the OneDrive
application that comes preinstalled on the Windows 8 operating system. 
2. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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Supreme Court has recognized several exceptions.3 Courts face the
challenge of applying these standards as society and technology
evolve beyond the immediate foresight of the Fourth Amendment’s
drafters. Winston’s predicament highlights not only the general
Fourth Amendment difficulties intrinsic to searching computers, but
also the added complications of privacy and the Internet.
The aforementioned hypothetical dealt specifically with issues
surrounding cloud computing. Cloud computing is a colloquial term
for computer services provided remotely over the Internet, rather
than by direct local access.4 Cloud computing has both a private and
a public form. A private cloud hosts services to a limited number of
people,5 whereas a public cloud is one offered through a third-party
service to general consumers.6 In particular, cloud storage is a term
for storing data and files on remote drives.7 A user essentially sends
their files to another location where the files are redundantly pre-
served.8
Companies providing public cloud storage maintain user data on
clusters of networked servers at off-site locations.9 Users can upload
data to cloud servers in various ways, including placing files in a
folder that synchronizes with the storage service,10 accessing the
account directly from an Internet browser, or doing so through
cloud-linked software installed on a computer.11 Generally, cloud ac-
counts permit users to access their data from any Internet-capable
3. See infra Part III.
4. Margaret Rouse, Cloud Computing, TECH TARGET, http://searchcloudcomputing.
techtarget.com/definition/cloud-computing [http://perma.cc/HCV3-R6FU] (last visited Apr. 11,
2015).
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Mickey Meece, A User’s Guide to Finding Storage Space in the Cloud, N.Y. TIMES, May
17, 2012, at B6; Walter S. Mossberg, Learning About Everything Under the “Cloud,” WALL ST.
J., May 6, 2010, at D1.
8. See Meece, supra note 7.
9. Jonathan Strickland, How Cloud Computing Works, HOWSTUFFWORKS, http://
computer.howstuffworks.com/cloud-computing/cloud-computing.htm [http://perma.cc/V3VW-
8T86] (last visited Apr. 11, 2015).
10. Ian Paul, Top 15 Cloud Storage Tips and Tasks, PCWORLD (May 6, 2012, 6:00 PM),
http://www.pcworld.com/article/255072/top_15_cloud_storage_tips_and_tasks.html [http://
perma.cc/P485-GHG5].
11. See Rouse, supra note 4. Linking software to cloud services creates a direct connection
between a user and his or her storage account, without requiring the user to access the site
independently from the Internet. Id.
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device that has a web browser or cloud-linked software.12 Winston’s
computer hosted cloud-linked software. The files the police collected
via that program were not on his hard drive, and the warrant only
specified files that were actually on his machine. The question
becomes whether the existence of software on the hard drive with
direct access to outside files permits the police to broaden their
search.
The backbone of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence developed
prior to the advent of personal computers, and its modern applica-
tion can be fraught with difficulty. Even applying these principles
to storage mediums that police have actually seized proves trouble-
some,13 particularly in the context of the plain view exception to the
warrant requirement.14 Those uncertainties only get murkier when
physical computers and the Internet collide. Recently, courts have
begun to address these issues in a modern digital context,15 but
scholarship on the subject is limited.16
The number of people storing data though cloud services is in-
creasing.17 Soon, if not already, Winston’s plight will cease being
hypothetical. There must be clarity as to whether law enforcement
can use locally installed software to access data stored on cloud
12. Mossberg, supra note 7. 
13. Orin S. Kerr, Searches and Seizures in a Digital World, 119 HARV. L. REV. 531, 537
(2005).
14. See United States v. Galpin, 720 F.3d 436, 447-48 (2d Cir. 2013); Kerr, supra note 13,
at 576; infra Part III.A (providing a more in-depth description of the plain view doctrine).
15. See, e.g., United States v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952, 965 (9th Cir. 2013) (discussing
cloud storage and the Fourth Amendment within the scope of the distinct border search
doctrine); United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 288 (6th Cir. 2010) (discussing the Fourth
Amendment and e-mail).
16. Professor Orin Kerr, a leading authority on the Fourth Amendment in the digital
context, specifically notes that such scholarly inquiry is sparse. Orin S. Kerr, Applying the
Fourth Amendment to the Internet: A General Approach, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1005, 1006 (2010).
Much of the scholarly analysis of the Fourth Amendment and cloud storage has come in the
form of other student notes. See, e.g., Derek Constantine, Note, Cloud Computing: The Next
Great Technological Innovation, the Death of Online Privacy, or Both?, 28 GA. ST. U. L. REV.
499, 514-15 (2012); David A. Couillard, Note, Defogging the Cloud: Applying Fourth Amend-
ment Principles to Evolving Privacy Expectations in Cloud Computing, 93 MINN. L. REV. 2205,
2205-06 (2009); William Jeremy Robison, Note, Free at What Cost?: Cloud Computing Under
the Stored Communications Act, 98 GEO. L.J. 1195, 1209 (2010).
17. Karen A. Frenkel, Demand for Cloud Storage: No End in Sight, CIO INSIGHT (Sept.
6, 2013), http://www.cioinsight.com/it-strategy/cloud-virtualization/slideshows/demand-for-
cloud-storage-no-end-in-sight.html [http://perma.cc/ZV7T-XNDL]. 
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servers—but not on the local machine—because they can see and
access the files when searching a suspect’s computer. Winston could
argue that he had a separate expectation of privacy, and that the
police had no right to comb through his cloud storage. The police
could then counter that such an expectation is not reasonable, and
that the Fourth Amendment does not protect information stored on
the Internet. Alternatively, authorities may argue that even if such
a protection exists, they were justified in bypassing the warrant re-
quirement because the files were in plain view of their lawful
search, or because of the risk that Winston could destroy the data
via remote access.
Others have discussed expectations of privacy in cloud storage in
different contexts, and some have grappled with issues similar to
those discussed in this Note.18 This Note, however, will focus on the
relationship between cloud storage and locally installed software on
a home computer. It will argue that a proper reading of the Fourth
Amendment and the surrounding circumstances vindicates Winston
and constrains the police. Under the Fourth Amendment, the police
do not have an automatic right to rifle through cloud storage via
software installed on computers they search. Part I of this Note will
discuss the general Fourth Amendment problems associated with
searching physical hard drives that the police have under their
control. Part II will argue that consumers have a reasonable expec-
tation of privacy in data they keep in cloud storage. Part III will
demonstrate why cloud data that is accessible through local soft-
ware does not come under the umbrella of the plain view doctrine or
the exigency exception to the warrant requirement. Finally, Part IV
will offer a solution that courts may employ to properly preserve
Fourth Amendment protections, as well as to enable the police to
carry out their mission to enforce the law.
18. See, e.g., Constantine, supra note 16, at 525-28 (discussing the third-party doctrine
with regard to different cloud storage providers); Nicolette Lotrionte, Note, The Sky’s the
Limit: The Border Search Doctrine and Cloud Computing, 78 BROOK. L. REV. 663, 664-65
(2013) (examining how cloud computing and storage intersect with the expanded powers of
the border search doctrine); Robison, supra note 16, at 1209-18 (discussing cloud storage
providers and the Stored Communications Act); Mark Wilson, Comment, Castle in the Cloud:
Modernizing Constitutional Protections for Cloud-Stored Data on Mobile Devices, 43 GOLDEN
GATE U. L. REV. 261, 263-64 (2013) (discussing cloud computing in the mobile context).
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I. BACKGROUND
The Fourth Amendment preserves the right of people to “be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects[ ] against unrea-
sonable searches and seizures;” and warrants, supported by prob-
able cause, must “particularly describ[e] the place to be searched,
and the persons or things to be seized.”19 The Amendment’s central
concern is protecting individual liberty and providing security from
government intrusion.20
A. A Reasonable Expectation of Privacy
The Fourth Amendment is not absolute. Its protections shield
individuals only in a realm in which they can maintain a reasonable
expectation of privacy.21 With the 1967 watershed opinion Katz v.
United States, the Court recognized for the first time that a reason-
able expectation of privacy is critical to Fourth Amendment search
and seizure analysis.22 In that case, the police eavesdropped on Katz
without a warrant as he made a phone call from a telephone booth.23
The Court struck down his conviction, ruling that such action consti-
tuted a search under the Fourth Amendment, and therefore re-
quired judicial approval.24
Rejecting a prior approach, which indicated that there needed to
be some physical trespass to offend the Fourth Amendment,25 the
Court concluded that Katz justifiably relied on an expectation of
privacy, and that warrantlessly violating that expectation breached
his rights.26 This is because the Fourth Amendment, as the Court
decreed, protects people, and is not limited to particular places.27
19. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
20. See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886).
21. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
22. Id.
23. Id. at 349 (majority opinion).
24. See id. at 359.
25. Id. at 353.
26. Id. at 359.
27. Id. at 351. That is not to say that “places” are not important concerns. This provision
protects people in part by specifically limiting the places that law enforcement may permis-
sibly search. Id.
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For an expectation of privacy to be reasonable, not only must the
individual have a subjective expectation of privacy, but also society
as a whole must objectively believe that such an expectation is sen-
sible.28 Moreover, to be reasonable, that objective expectation must
be justifiable given the facts of the surrounding circumstances.29
Part of the Court’s implicit reasoning in Katz was that the “vital
role that the public telephone has come to play in private communi-
cation” established the reasonable expectation of privacy in Katz’s
telephone conversation.30 This indicates that what makes privacy
expectations reasonable is far from a static determination. Rather,
expectations shift as technology advances.31 The Court has already
addressed related matters, including issues involving aerial sur-
veillance32 and infrared scanning of homes.33 Most recently, the
Court recognized the role that cell phones have come to play in
modern society and the associated privacy interests that citizens
have in these devices.34
B. General Fourth Amendment Challenges with Computers
Courts now consistently recognize that people possess a reason-
able expectation of privacy in their computers.35 Thus, searching one
28. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
29. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979).
30. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 352.
31. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 962 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring) (“[T]he Katz
test rests on the assumption that this hypothetical reasonable person has a well-developed
and stable set of privacy expectations. But technology can change those expectations. Dramat-
ic technological change may lead to periods in which popular expectations are in flux and may
ultimately produce significant changes in popular attitudes.”).
32. Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 451 (1989) (holding that observing a citizen’s property
from a legal altitude did not constitute a search).
33. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40-41 (2001) (holding that using an infrared heat
scanner on a home was a search, and was impermissible without a warrant).
34. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2485 (2014) (requiring that police generally obtain
a warrant before they can search a cell phone). That is not to say the Court was not cognizant
of the privacy interest in cell phones prior to Riley. See City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct.
2619, 2630 (2010) (“Cell phone and text message communications are so pervasive that some
persons may consider them to be essential means or necessary instruments for self-expres-
sion, even self-identification. That might strengthen the case for an expectation of privacy.”).
35. See, e.g., United States v. Heckenkamp, 482 F.3d 1142, 1146 (9th Cir. 2007)
(“Individuals generally possess a reasonable expectation of privacy in their home computers.”
(quoting United States v. Lifshitz, 369 F.3d 173, 190 (2d Cir. 2004)); Trulock v. Freeh, 275
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without its owner’s consent requires a warrant or a valid exception
to the warrant requirement.
Professor Orin Kerr likens the computer hard drive to any other
variety of sealed container in which individuals would retain a pri-
vacy right.36 Yet, he acknowledges inherent Fourth Amendment
problems that arise when searching a computer hard drive. It is
difficult to describe with particularity the place to search given the
vast size of a hard drive and the innumerable places the owner
might hide data.37 Furthermore, courts struggle with the fact that
there is currently no way to know with certainty the type of data a
file contains without examining the contents closely.38
One tempting approach is to limit a computer search to certain
types of files—files specifically designed to contain data that might
be used as evidence of the pertinent crime.39 That method would
indeed accord with the spirit of the Fourth Amendment’s command
of particularity for its warrants,40 and some courts have tried to take
this approach when issuing warrants.41
F.3d 391, 403 (4th Cir. 2001); Guest v. Leis, 255 F.3d 325, 333 (6th Cir. 2001); see also United
States v. Ziegler, 474 F.3d 1184, 1190 (9th Cir. 2007) (recognizing a reasonable expectation
of privacy in an office computer); Leventhal v. Knapek, 266 F.3d 64, 73 (2d Cir. 2001) (same).
36. Kerr, supra note 13, at 549. 
37. Id. at 566.
38. United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 621 F.3d 1162, 1176 (9th Cir.
2010) (en banc). Authorities can perform computer searches through specialized forensic
software, or by simply opening a file and viewing the contents for themselves. 
39. For example, if the police are looking for evidence of child pornography, they could
limit their search to file types that support images or video. By contrast, if the police are
investigating bank fraud, they could reserve their inquiry for files that support text editing.
See THOMAS K. CLANCY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: ITS HISTORY AND INTERPRETATION 579-80
(2008).
40. Much motivation for the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement grew from anger
toward general warrants and writs of assistance in colonial America. THOMAS N. MCINNIS,
THE EVOLUTION OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 15-20 (2009). Those measures afforded British
customs officers the ability to search colonial homes and buildings for any suspected
contraband, imposing no limitations on what authorities might seek. WILLIAM J. CUDDIHY,
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: ORIGINS AND ORIGINAL MEANING 307, 320-21, 537-38 (2009). 
41. United States v. Gleich, 397 F.3d 608, 611 (8th Cir. 2005) (upholding a warrant
limiting the search of a suspect’s computer to files that could “contain photographs, pictures,
visual representations or videos in any form that include sexual conduct by a minor”) (internal
quotation marks omitted); State v. Maxwell, 825 A.2d 1224, 1234 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.
2001) (authorizing a warrant to specifically search “computer address books” in investigating
a suspect’s phone calls to minor sexual assault victims).
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Ultimately, however, such limitations might not be feasible given
the realities of digital storage. Users often employ file types includ-
ing “.jpeg” for images,42 “.avi” for video,43 “.docx” for text documents
in Microsoft Word,44 and countless other types for countless other
purposes. It would be quite simple to segregate a search by file type
depending on the focus of the search, but that more than likely
would be a fruitless exercise. By changing a few letters in a file’s
name, one can make one form of data appear to be another.45 Such
a change would make a directed search for specific file types ineffec-
tive and require a much more thorough examination in order to de-
termine what a computer file stores.46 Furthermore, users can
compress data to make files appear much smaller than their normal
size,47 which, like data encryption,48 could confound authorities.
Additionally, there is nothing stopping someone engaged in bank
fraud from taking pictures of their documents and storing them as
actual images, as opposed to changing a file type. The same is true
for someone seeking to hide illicit images in a word processing docu-
ment.
The difficulty in searching computer files leads to tricky appli-
cations of the plain view doctrine, a recognized exception to the
warrant requirement.49 In order to apply that exception, the incrim-
inating character of a piece of evidence must be readily apparent,
42. .Jpeg, PC.NET, http://pc.net/extensions/file/jpeg [http://perma.cc/VZ8P-ES52] (last
updated June 2, 2009).
43. .Avi, PC.NET, http://pc.net/extensions/file/avi [http://perma.cc/X3TQ-8G7D] (last
updated May 20, 2009).
44. .Docx, PC.NET, http://pc.net/extensions/file/docx [http://perma.cc/LY5B-YKGE] (last
updated Oct. 17, 2009).
45. See Kerr, supra note 13, at 545-47; How to Change a File Extension in Windows,
MEDIACOLLEGE.COM, http://www.mediacollege.com/microsoft/windows/extension-change.html
[http://perma.cc/5HZ5-HJX4] (last visited Apr. 11, 2015).
46. United States v. Galpin, 720 F.3d 436, 444 (2d Cir. 2013); CLANCY, supra note 39, at
581-83; Kerr, supra note 13, at 545.
47. Andrew Vahid Moshirnia, Note, Separating Hard Fact from Hard Drive: A Solution
for Plain View Doctrine in the Digital Domain, 23 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 609, 612 (2010).
48. Id. at 612-13.
49. Id.
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among other things.50 As mentioned, this is not always the case with
a computer file.
The Second Circuit dealt with some of these computer search
difficulties in United States v. Galpin. In that case, the police
searched a convicted sex offender’s computer for violating a registra-
tion requirement for an online screen name.51 While conducting the
search, investigators opened various types of files, including images
and video, and inadvertently found depictions of child pornogra-
phy.52 When remanding the case to the district court, the Second
Circuit warned of a need for heightened sensitivity to warrant
particularity during computer searches.53 It called upon the fact
finder to determine whether a search for registration violations
truly necessitated opening video files.54
The Second Circuit’s attempt to constrain a broad interpretation
of the plain view doctrine does not address the aforementioned is-
sues. It fails to account for the fact that file extensions might be
changed, or for content hidden in files that is different from their
natural format. Moreover, as the opinion admits, authorities still
have no way to tell what is inside a file without close examination.
This combination of issues underscores the problem with using
access to individual computers as permission to search data stored
on the cloud. If law enforcement obtains a warrant to search a whole
computer for incriminating evidence, “the government may claim
50. Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 136-37 (1990). For a more in-depth discussion of
the plain view criteria and how attempts to search cloud storage complicate this approach,
see infra Part III.A .
51. Galpin, 720 U.S. at 440. Originally, the police’s warrant was overbroad and permitted
a search of the computer for any “violations of Penal Law statutes, Corrections Law statutes
and or Federal statutes.” Id. The district court redacted the warrant believing that the valid
portions were severable from the invalid portions. Id. at 449. The Second Circuit vacated that
judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings to develop a factual record to help
determine severability. Id. at 439. The court held that if the invalid portions of the warrant
could not be severed, the initial search itself would be unconstitutional. Id. at 451.
52. Id. at 444.
53. Id. at 447. The opinion notes that courts should pay special attention to the particular
nature of a crime, as the expanse of information under the plain view doctrine could poten-
tially turn any warrant to search a computer into a general warrant for criminal activity. See
id.
54. Id. at 452.
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that the contents of every file it chose to open were in plain view.”55
There may indeed be files stored similarly to Winston’s: namely,
that they exist on servers that connect to local computers via the
Internet, but with no copies stored on the actual machine. Despite
this, programs installed on his computer could detect those files and
download them directly, without having to access external websites
through a web browser. If all files on a computer are in plain view,
then police seemingly have a carte blanche to search information
accessible through programs installed on the hard drive. This would
include cloud accounts linked to local software.
The balance of this discussion will demonstrate why law enforce-
ment officers do not have such power. First, Part II lays out why
consumers truly can retain an expectation of privacy in their cloud
storage accounts. Second, Part III will examine why the plain view
doctrine and other exceptions do not apply to cloud files accessible
through local software.
II. CLOUD STORAGE AND A REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY
A. Is There a Reasonable Expectation to Begin With?
To claim constitutional protections, users must have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in their cloud files.56 Affirmatively stating
that the Fourth Amendment extends to cloud content requires ac-
knowledging that people can maintain a reasonable expectation of
privacy in their general Internet accounts. Courts appear increas-
ingly willing to confer such protection on e-mail,57 and at least one
leading Fourth Amendment commentator recognizes that user reli-
ance on password protection can create a reasonable privacy expec-
tation for Internet accounts.58
55. Id. at 447. Consequently, if the government finds evidence of a crime they were not
searching for, they may still use that evidence to prosecute the suspect. Id.
56. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
57. United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 282 (6th Cir. 2010); Quon v. Arch Wireless
Operating Co., 529 F.3d 892, 905-06 (9th Cir. 2008) (analogizing the content of e-mails to the
content of letters), rev’d sub nom. on other grounds, City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619
(2010).
58. 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
§ 2.6(f) (4th ed. 2004); see also Katz, 389 U.S. at 352 (majority opinion) (“One who occupies [a
telephone booth and] shuts the door behind him ... is surely entitled to assume that the words
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Supreme Court decisions offer no exclusive test for what makes
expectations of privacy reasonable, and Professor Kerr suggests that
courts employ various models in reaching their conclusions.59 No
method is mutually exclusive, and courts ultimately may rely on
syntheses of these approaches in arriving at their outcomes.60
In what Professor Kerr terms the “probabilistic” model, a reason-
able expectation of privacy hinges “on the chance that a sensible
person would predict that he would maintain his privacy.”61 This
approach requires consideration of the societal norms at play.62
Societal norms are indeed evolving and doing so in stride with
technological progress. Most citizens would not view data in remote
storage as being any less confidential than data on their home
computers.63 As previously stated, however, relying on one model
and considering social norms and practice is not the exclusive way
to deduce a reasonable expectation of privacy. Statutory law is also
instructive.
he utters into the mouthpiece will not be broadcast to the world.”).
59. Orin S. Kerr, Four Models of Fourth Amendment Protection, 60 STAN. L. REV. 503, 505
(2007). Kerr points out that these models cannot serve as the sole guide to determining Fourth
Amendment protection, but they are useful in examining how courts come to their decisions.
See id. at 531-42.
60. Id. at 508.
61. Id. 
62. Id. at 508 n.19 (citing Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 n.12 (1978)) (discussing
“understandings that are recognized and permitted by society”); see Georgia v. Randolph, 547
U.S. 103, 111 (2006) (“The constant element in assessing Fourth Amendment reasonableness
in the consent cases, then, is the great significance given to widely shared social expecta-
tions.”); Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 98 (1990); State v. Hempele, 576 A.2d 793, 802 (N.J.
1990); Sherry F. Colb, What Is a Search? Two Conceptual Flaws in Fourth Amendment
Doctrine and Some Hints of a Remedy, 55 STAN. L. REV. 119, 124 (2002); Katherine J. Strand-
burg, Home, Home on the Web and Other Fourth Amendment Implications of Technosocial
Change, 70 MD. L. REV. 614, 619 (2011) (arguing that courts should apply a principle of
“technosocial continuity” of viewing privacy, accounting for how advancing technology can
make citizens more vulnerable); see also Kerr, supra note 13, at 536.
63. State v. Bellar, 217 P.3d 1094, 1110-11 (Or. Ct. App. 2009) (Sercombe, J., dissenting);
see also United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 621 F.3d 1162, 1176 (9th Cir.
2010) (en banc); Couillard, supra note 16, at 2205.
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1. Positive Model of Privacy and the Electronic Communications
Privacy Act
A simultaneous alternative and complement to considering social
norms is the “positive” model of Fourth Amendment protection. This
approach requires the court to ask whether some law, other than
the Fourth Amendment, prohibits government intrusion.64 The no-
tion is that there is a reasonable expectation of privacy if the
government needs to circumvent one of its own laws to access infor-
mation.65
There is no specific government statute dealing with data in cloud
storage. In fact, the primary law addressing privacy and data pass-
ing through the Internet is Title II of the Electronic Communication
Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA), otherwise known as the Stored Com-
munications Act (SCA).66 The SCA recognizes two types of Internet
services—Electronic Communication Services (ECS)67 and Remote
Computing Services (RCS)68—and creates a privacy framework for
each by prohibiting disclosure of storage contents, except in limited
circumstances.69 This law is nearly thirty years old. Courts and
commentators alike take on the thorny duty of applying the SCA’s
provisions to modern technology, and its compatibility with cloud
storage is far from clear. It is necessary to analyze cloud storage
under the dual frameworks offered in the SCA, beginning first with
the ECS, which ultimately suffers a hazy application and, as
currently written, likely would not encompass cloud storage.
a. Electronic Communication Services
The Electronic Communications Services (ECS) provision applies
to services capable of “send[ing] or receive[ing] ... electronic commu-
nications.”70 Strictly speaking, users with cloud storage accounts
64. Kerr, supra note 59, at 516-18.
65. Id. Additionally, this approach asks whether the public could already access such in-
formation at the time of the alleged instruction. See id.
66. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2712 (2012).
67. Id. § 2702(a)(1).
68. Id. § 2702(a)(2).
69. Id. § 2702(a)-(c).
70. Id. § 2510(15). 
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might not employ them for pure communication from one person or
entity to another if the users’ primary purpose is preserving their
own data. Regardless, the law broadly defines electronic communi-
cation to include “signs, signals, writings, images, sounds, data or
intelligence of any nature.”71 Cloud storage is more than capable of
transmitting the sort of media defined by statute,72 and nowhere
does the law limit the concept of communication to transmissions
involving two or more parties. Indeed, a broad understanding of
communicative media goes hand in hand with an expansive view of
communication. Cloud account holders can share their materials
with other account holders, and more than one person can use the
same account from different locations.73 It is premature to assume
as a matter of course that users do not use this sharing function as
a surrogate method of communication.
Alternatively, cloud storage permits communication between a
single user’s individual devices, sometimes with outright synchroni-
zation between them.74 As such, no reason exists to exclude cloud
storage categorically from consideration as an ECS. Furthermore,
there are other commentators that consider cloud storage analogous
to e-mail accounts, which would gain clearer protection under the
law.75
There are other requirements necessary for the ECS to apply. For
example, storage must be “temporary[,] intermediate[,] ... [and] inci-
dental to the electronic transmission,” and “for purposes of backup
protection.”76 The Ninth Circuit construed the term “backup” nar-
rowly: a file must serve as a spare copy.77 If the remote storage is
the only place where the user keeps the data, it would not be a back-
up, and thus would not receive statutory protection.78 Additionally,
71. Id. § 2510(12).
72. See Strickland, supra note 9.
73. For example, members of the William & Mary Law Review share a cloud storage
account provided by Dropbox. All members have the password and use the account to pool
information to ready each issue for publication.
74. Real time synchronization between devices is an example of when devices are actively
communicating with each other. See Paul, supra note 10.
75. Wilson, supra note 18, at 273.
76. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(17)(A)-(B).
77. See Theofel v. Farey-Jones, 359 F.3d 1066, 1077 (9th Cir. 2004).
78. See id.
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cloud storage has the possibility of long-term data protection.79
There is nothing inherently temporary about this data, and there is
no way to glean a user’s intended use ex ante merely from the ap-
pearance of files in storage.
b. Remote Computing Services
The Stored Communications Act’s Remote Computing Services
(RCS) provisions grant cloud storage a measure of privacy protec-
tion that is not as stringent as a full warrant requirement, though
not without some difficulty. An RCS must contain content, be a
“computer storage or processing service[ ] by means of an electronic
communications system,”80 and receive data from users electroni-
cally.81 Additionally, the service must be maintained “solely for the
purpose of providing storage or computer processing services to such
subscriber or customer, if the provider is not authorized to access the
contents of any such communications for purposes of providing any
services other than storage or computer processing.”82
Cloud storage satisfies the first of the necessary elements: it is by
its very nature storage transmitted electronically, and the transfer-
red files make up the content.83 The last two requirements, however,
lead some commentators to believe that cloud accounts may not fall
under the Act’s umbrella.84 A primary concern is that business
models for many cloud providers include accessing and employing
user-uploaded data for advertising and other purposes.85 Providers
often gain consent for such actions within the terms of service,
which users agree to when registering. The claim then becomes that
users are no longer transmitting data solely for the purposes of
storage and processing.86
79. Robison, supra note 16, at 1209.
80. 18 U.S.C. § 2711(2).
81. Id. § 2702(a)(2)(A).
82. Id. § 2702(a)(2)(B) (emphasis added).
83. See supra notes 4-12 and accompanying text.
84. Robison, supra note 16, at 1208-09.
85. Id. at 1213-14.
86. Id. at 1215-16. For discussion on how ToS agreements relate to the third-party doc-
trine, see infra Part II.B.
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Careful reading of the statute does not preclude considering a
service to be an RCS, even if it retains the ability to make use of the
data in ways other than exclusively for storage. The law indicates
that the purpose of services must be limited to storage and process-
ing unless the user has authorized the provider to access his data for
another reason.87 Many service agreements do just that,88 and courts
seem willing to use those permissions to preserve application of the
SCA.89
Necessarily, the extent to which the RCA applies depends on
what the terms of service say. In a situation where files are stored
on a cloud via local software, police would have no way of knowing
if files came under RCS protection unless they did some investiga-
tion into the nature of the user agreement with the cloud provider.
2. The Current Law’s Future and Policy Judgments
It requires noting that as the ECPA currently stands, the privacy
protections of the SCA technically dissolve 180 days after data is
first stored in an ECS,90 and RCS services gain even less protection
from an outright government search.91 There are some courts that
consider these permissive privacy elements to be unconstitutional.92
In addition, as noted, statutory protection is but one foundation for
a reasonable expectation of privacy to stand, and the courts may
adopt a litany of approaches that work together. Even if the SCA
suffers an imperfect application in the cloud-computing context,
progressing social norms help buttress the notion that people can
reasonably expect their data to remain concealed from government
eyes. Indications from Congress show that some lawmakers share
a similar view.
87. 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a)(2)(B).
88. Terms of Service, YOUTUBE (June 9, 2010), http://www.youtube.com/t/terms [http://
perma.cc/KS6M-J33M].
89. Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. Youtube Inc., 253 F.R.D. 256, 264 n.8 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
90. Id. § 2703(a).
91. Id. § 2703(b).
92. See United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 288 (6th Cir. 2010); see also Kerr, supra
note 16, at 1043.
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The ECPA was an attempt by Congress to address privacy con-
cerns that existed at the time.93 Some current members recognize
that the ECPA’s limited provisions no longer comport with the
realities of modern technology.94 In 2013, representatives in both
chambers introduced legislation that would eliminate the 180-day
rule and require warrants regardless of how long users keep data in
electronic storage.95 Although each bill received favorable consider-
ation, neither was enacted.96
The changing tides in Congress, along with the societal assump-
tion that there is privacy in online accounts, provides mounting
justification for courts to draw a normative policy decision favoring
expectations of privacy in cloud storage. Professor Kerr notes that
from a realist perspective, changing societal assumptions may often
be the driving factor behind the Supreme Court’s rationale.97 He
explains that this is what occurred in Katz, in which the Justices
considered and weighed the vital role that the telephone had come
to play in society.98
This approach is on display in Kyllo v. United States, which held
that warrantless use of infrared technology to scan the interior of
a home violated the Fourth Amendment.99 The Court acknowl-
edged that technology has affected citizens’ privacy rights under the
Fourth Amendment,100 but noted that it must take a long view of
93. Electronic Communications Privacy Act: Hearings on H.R. 3378 Before the Subcomm.
on Courts, Civil Liberties & the Admin. of Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th
Cong. 6-8 (2013) (statement of Sen. Pat Leahy). 
94. Zach Walton, Senate Judiciary Committee to Debate ECPA Reform This Week,
WEBPRONEWS (Apr. 15, 2013), http://www.webpronews.com/senate-judiciary-committee-to-
debate-ecpa-reform-this-week-2013-04 [http://perma.cc/WE6F-GG38].
95. Electronic Communications Privacy Act Amendments Act of 2013, S. 607, 113th Cong.
(2013); H.R. 1852, 113th Cong. (2013). In addition to Congress, many major cloud storage
providers have begun claiming that they will withhold user data from law enforcement unless
presented with a valid warrant. See Brendan Sasso, Facebook, E-mail Providers Say They
Require Warrants for Private Data Seizures, THE HILL (Jan. 25, 2013, 10:40 PM), http://
thehill.com/policy/technology/279441-facebook-email-providers-require-warrant-for-private-
data [http://perma.cc/78UB-8PNM].
96. Bill & Summary Status 113th Congress (2013-2014) S. 607 All Congressional Actions,
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d113:SN00607:@@@X [http://
perma.cc/RC58-R8LQ] (last visited Apr. 11, 2015).
97. Kerr, supra note 59, at 519.
98. Id. (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967)).
99. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001).
100. Id. at 33.
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Fourth Amendment limitations.101 To roll back protection from this
advancing form of technology in light of the societal expectation of
privacy in the home risked “erod[ing] the privacy guaranteed by the
Fourth Amendment.”102
The factors driving Katz, Kyllo, and the Court’s most recent
decision, Riley v. California, extend to data housed in cloud storage
accounts.103 The Internet and data stored within its vast framework
play an integral role in modern society, much as the telephone did
and continues to do. The number of cloud storage users continues to
grow faster and faster.104 Using the logic articulated in Katz, it is
arguable that cloud storage data is already private and is merely
awaiting formal judicial recognition of its role in society. Moreover,
shirking from providing a full-fledged privacy interest as technology
progresses runs afoul of the spirit of Kyllo and Riley, in which the
Court meshed the expectation of privacy with technological leaps.
B. The Third-Party Doctrine and Cloud Storage
This combination of social norms and positivist thinking supports
the notion that people retain a reasonable expectation of privacy in
their cloud storage accounts. Nonetheless, this does not mean that
alternative principles might not eliminate that expectation before
a user could assert it. This potential lies in the third-party doctrine,
which holds that one eliminates his own reasonable expectation of
privacy when he voluntarily shares information with a third par-
ty.105 Even a reasonable belief that the third party would not share
the information fails to preserve an expectation of privacy.106
The Court employed this rationale in several cases that form the
basis of the doctrine. In United States v. Miller, an individual could
101. Id. at 40; see also Kerr, supra note 59, at 520.
102. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34.
103. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014); Kyllo, 533 U.S. 27; Katz v. United States,
389 U.S. 347 (1967).
104. See Frenkel, supra note 17; Frederic Lardinois, Report: Cloud Storage Services Now
Have Over 375M Users, Could Reach 500M by Year-End, TECH CRUNCH (Oct. 15, 2012)
http://techcrunch.com/2012/10/15/report-cloud-storage-services-now-have-over-375m-users-
could-reach-500m-by-year-end [http://perma.cc/7YRE-73VU].
105. Smith v. Maryland, 422 U.S. 735, 743-44 (1979); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,
363 (1967) (White, J., concurring).
106. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976).
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not claim that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in records
kept by his bank regarding his account.107 Similarly, in Smith v.
Maryland, a person could not claim privacy in the phone numbers
he had voluntarily dialed that the phone company used to complete
the call.108 In both cases the defendant had willingly shared with the
third party the substance of their information. The question bec-
omes whether storing information on cloud servers is tantamount
to the “sharing” of information the Court dealt with in Smith and
Miller, and consequently enough to surrender a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy.109
There are essentially three different types of service agreements
that users can have with storage providers.110 The first are agree-
ments in which the provider retains the expressed right to access
and, in some cases, use the information provided.111 Second are
those in which providers engage in generic monitoring of content,
but do not intend to use information for alternate purposes.112 Third
are agreements in which providers expressly limit their own ability
to access storage contents.113 Each type of agreement requires mea-
suring the level of data shared with the provider.
107. Id. at 442.
108. Smith, 422 U.S. at 742. 
109. This is, of course, if the third-party doctrine itself is truly valid in the context of the
Internet. In her concurrence to United States v. Jones, Justice Sotomayor expressed her belief
that the third-party approach flowing from Smith is “ill suited to the digital age,” and that “it
may be necessary to reconsider the premise that an individual has no reasonable expectation
of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to third parties.” 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012)
(Sotomayor, J., concurring). This is in large part because “people reveal a great deal of infor-
mation about themselves to third parties in the course of carrying out mundane tasks.” Id.;
see also Susan W. Brenner, The Fourth Amendment in an Era of Ubiquitous Technology, 75
MISS. L.J. 1, 76-80 (2005) (arguing that the third-party doctrine does not apply to digital
intermediaries, rather digital intermediaries act as servants and aides within a reasonable
expectation of privacy than a true third party).
110. For a more thorough discussion of issues surrounding service agreements, see
Constantine, supra note 16, at 525-27.
111. See, e.g., Google Terms of Service, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/policies/terms/
[http://perma.cc/H3Z7-PTHM] (last updated Apr. 14, 2014).
112. See, e.g., Microsoft Services Agreement, WINDOWS, http://windows.microsoft.com/en-
us/windows/microsoft-services-agreement [http://perma.cc/LQR5-USSD] (last updated June
11, 2014) (“Content that violates this agreement, which includes the Microsoft Anti-Spam
Policy ... and the Microsoft Code of Conduct ... or your local law isn't permitted on the services.
Microsoft reserves the right to review content for the purpose of enforcing this agreement.”).
113. See, e.g., Mozy Privacy Policy, MOZY (May 14, 2009), http://www.mozy.com/privacy
[http://perma.cc/7S63-RYJR].
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The last type of agreement is where users most easily retain an
expectation of privacy. The provider’s professed lack of access cre-
ates a situation different from the third-party service at issue in
Miller and Smith. By storing data in a cloud account and protecting
it with a password, the account should become a separate container
with its own expectation of privacy.114 In a way, the account becomes
a technological successor to the safe deposit box.115 Even though the
provider of such storage could enter and view the contents, the un-
derstanding is that the provider will not access the account, and
therfore, law enforcement authorities do not have the right to enter
such private spaces.116
Providers with a terms of service conferring broader access rights
present a more complicated issue.117 Each terms of service allows
providers to have some measure of access to files that users upload,
though some restrict their involvement to merely screening for
objectionable content,118 whereas others reserve the right to use the
content for other purposes.119 Seemingly, the portion of these terms
of service agreements that permit considering cloud storage an RCS
would paradoxically defeat an expectation of privacy.120 After all, by
signing up for services with broad access rights, people are voluntar-
ily permitting access to their data, even if in a limited way. Never-
theless, despite the necessary disclosure of information to providers,
changes in technology justify evolving considerations of the Fourth
Amendment.121 Correspondingly, such changes call for a new
114. See Couillard, supra note 16, at 2237-38.
115. Wilson, supra note 18, at 276; see also United States v. First Nat’l City Bank, 568 F.2d
853, 860-61 (2d Cir. 1977) (demonstrating that there can be a reasonable expectation of
privacy in safe deposit boxes).
116. See Couillard, supra note 16, at 2237-38; Wilson, supra note 18, at 276.
117. Constantine, supra note 16, at 514-15.
118. See, e.g., Microsoft Services Agreement, supra note 112 (listing the terms of service
applying to SkyDrive cloud storage).
119. See, e.g., Google Terms of Service, supra note 111 (listing the terms of service applying
to all Google services, including Google Drive).
120. See 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a)(2)(B) (2012) (addressing voluntary disclosures of consumer
information).
121. See Katz v. United States, 398 U.S. 347, 352 (1967) (conferring privacy rights in
telephone conversations by evaluating changing technology).
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understanding of the third-party doctrine to properly address the
realities of digital storage.122
To assess the expectation of privacy in cloud storage, it is impor-
tant to consider the ways in which transferring information to a
cloud provider differs from the classic third party cases. Professor
Patricia Bellia suggests limited application of the third-party doc-
trine and offers a useful approach.123 She posits that highlighting
those differences requires asking: (1) What “type of information is
at issue”? (2) What is the purpose in transferring the information to
the third party? (3) How relevant is the information’s substance to
the third party’s activities? and (4) How limited is “the third party’s
ability to access and use the information”?124
One can answer the first two questions simply. In Miller and
Smith, the Court considered financial information and phone num-
bers transferred to third parties to complete a multistep task on the
transferors’ behalf.125 The information within the files uploaded to
the cloud can potentially contain limitless varieties of data, includ-
ing bank records and phone numbers. The difference, however, is in
the transfer’s purpose.
Those who store data in cloud accounts seek safe receptacles for
their information, as opposed to commissioning the cloud provider
to provide a service beyond preservation.126 Rather than seeking a
multistep partnership, the cloud account users engage with pro-
viders so that they may act as mere custodians of the data, thus en-
suring that such data is neither lost nor damaged. There is only one
step: storing the data. One is not “revealing his affairs to another”
as the Miller defendant did,127 because the user is not engaging the
provider for some other task beyond receipt and preservation.
Virtually all cloud storage providers, even those with an expansive
122. See Patricia L. Bellia, Surveillance Law Through Cyberlaw's Lens, 72 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1375, 1403-05 (2004) (describing why the third-party doctrine should be construed
narrowly in the computer/Internet context).
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Smith v. Maryland, 422 U.S. 735, 743-44 (1979); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435,
442 (1976).
126. David S. Barnhill, Cloud Computing and Stored Communications: Another Look at
Quon v. Arch Wireless, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 621, 645 (2010).
127. Bellia, supra note 122, at 1404 (citing Miller, 425 U.S. at 443).
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terms of service, preserve that distinction at least in terms of the
purpose behind the transmission,128 which is storing user data.
Regarding the third question, whether the substance of the data
a user provides is relevant to third party activity, hinges on how one
defines activity. Limiting the understanding of “activity” to the ser-
vice the provider performs on behalf of the user means that activity
is limited to the storage itself; the content of files and the substance
of the data is not relevant to that activity.129 Even providers that
monitor uploaded file data to remove objectionable content130 cannot
claim that the substance of the file is relevant to their activity of
storage. A broad understanding of activity that encompasses all of
the actions cloud providers might take with user data is inadequate.
The narrow approach corresponds with the purpose of why users
engage cloud providers in the first place: to store data, not to crowd-
source content for a company.131
It is the last of Professor Bellia’s questions that may permit dif-
ferent conclusions stemming from different terms of service. The
limits on third-party access to information do vary substantially
based on the agreement between the parties.132 Providers that pri-
marily access uploaded data for the purpose of monitoring for
objectionable content are not using the substance of the content to
perform their activity, which is storage. Instead, they are consider-
ing it through a retroactive screening function, and the substance
of uploaded data has no bearing on the act of storing itself.
Providers, such as Google, are another matter. Google retains
broad rights to access and use customer-uploaded content.133 Even
with Google and other comparable companies that might retain
128. See, e.g., Microsoft Services Ageement, supra note 112.
129. File size would be relevant to this activity, as every cloud provider considers storage
size capacities in price and service computation. Jill Duffy, The Best Cloud Storage Services
for 2015, PCMAG (Mar. 26, 2015), http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2413556,00.asp
[http:// perma.cc/95RU-2RZ6].
130. See Microsoft Services Agreement, supra note 112 (outlining the terms of service apply-
ing to SkyDrive cloud storage).
131. See Bellia, supra note 122, at 1404-05.
132. See supra notes 110-12 and accompanying text.
133. Google Terms of Service, supra note 111 (defining terms of service that give Google
access to “content” submitted by users, implying more than just file management, but also
what the files contain). Additionally, Google not only stores data, but also retains the right
to use data for “operating, promoting, and improving ... services, and to develop new ones.”
Id.
2015] SEARCHING CLOUD STORAGE ACCOUNTS 2343
extensive rights, most of the salient questions point to keeping an
expectation of privacy. However, given the wholesale revelation and
access rights, a court could possibly conclude that one surrenders
his expectation of privacy when he gives information over to the
most prying of providers. By the nature of these agreements, the
user does not substantively limit the scope of the provider’s access.
III. CLOUD STORAGE AND LOCAL SOFTWARE
As demonstrated in Part II, there is ample justification to believe
that users maintain a reasonable expectation of privacy in their
cloud storage accounts. Considering the differing terms of service,
societal expectations of privacy, muddled statutory law, and the fact
that privacy policies for Internet services often change, law enforce-
ment cannot simply assume that it can access cloud data without a
warrant.134 Law enforcement agents would need some exception to
the warrant requirement to view these contents without judicial
approval. Therefore, when the police obtain a warrant to search an
individual suspect’s computer and find cloud-connected local soft-
ware, as they did with the hypothetical character Winston, they
must find a justification to sidestep the warrant requirement.135 The
two most likely reasons they might offer would be the plain view
and exigent circumstances exceptions.
A. Plain View
For evidence to come under the plain view exception, it must
meet three requirements: (1) the incriminating nature of the evi-
dence must be readily apparent, (2) officers must have a lawful
vantage point to view it, and (3) officers must be in a location to
lawfully seize the evidence.136 Regarding the first element, cloud
computing retains the same plain view concerns as local computing:
there is essentially no way to know what is inside of a file without
134. Without examining privacy policies and practices of the storage providers, the police
cannot know if the suspect has surrendered a reasonable expectation of privacy, and, as the
cloud files are not on the machine they are searching, such content is outside the scope of the
warrant.
135. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
136. Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 136-37 (1990).
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examining it.137 Despite that similarity, the nature of the cloud does
change the analysis with regard to the second and third parts of the
exception. Relevant doctrine supports the notion that law enforce-
ment does not have a lawful vantage point from which to view cloud
data or to seize it while using local software.
Practically speaking, when police obtain a warrant to search a
computer, they can access all of the files stored on that machine.
Such a search is not restricted to only pure data files; it also in-
cludes programs and applications installed on the machine. Seem-
ingly, that search would also include files one can see in those
installed applications.
That assumption, however, is premature, as the Fourth Amend-
ment protects a person’s individual effects from government intru-
sion as well.138 One such “effect” is a container, which is an object
capable of containing another object.139 The Court affords containers
full Fourth Amendment protection and does not evaluate their
worthiness.140 Although it is digital and does not contain physical
objects per se, many courts and commentators believe that a com-
puter hard drive is functionally equivalent to a container.141 There
is no meaningful distinction between storing files on a remote drive
or a local one beyond the difference in location. Like a computer
itself, the information stored on Internet accounts is analogous to
items in locked containers.142
The seeming consensus is that the existence of password protec-
tion for virtual accounts, drives, and files preserves the expectation
of privacy.143 There is a chance that a person might leave his cloud
137. See supra Part I.B.
138. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
139. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 455, 460 n.4 (1981).
140. United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 822 (1982).
141. See, e.g., Davis v. Gracey, 111 F.3d 1472, 1480 (10th Cir. 1997); United States v. Al-
Marri, 230 F. Supp. 2d 535, 541 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); People v. Gall, 30 P.3d 145, 153-54 (Colo.
2001) (analogizing computers as containers similar to filing cabinets); Kerr, supra note 13, at
549.
142. Strandburg, supra note 62, at 660.
143. Id.; see Kerr, supra note 16, at 1021; see also United States v. Stabile, 633 F.3d. 219,
233 (3d Cir. 2011) (considering whether password protection is used to determine whether a
reasonable expectation of privacy exists for a computer hard drive); United States v. Buckner,
473 F.3d 551, 554 n.2 (4th Cir. 2007) (recognizing a reasonable expectation of privacy in
password-protected computer files); Trulock v. Freeh, 275 F.3d 391, 403 (4th Cir. 2001)
(same).
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program logged in or with the password saved. This too would not
destroy his reasonable expectation of privacy. Even though it might
not be locked digitally from that specific location, accessing the
cloud account from another computer would require a password.
Moreover, a separate expectation of privacy exists in the computer
that can access the account. As such, the true hinging point is not
always the existence of the password, but whether the user has left
his data open for the whole world to see.
The account is still a closed container, and as the police still need
to take steps to access the contents, one cannot fairly say that cloud
accounts are merely transparent vessels for the police to peer into.144
Even though the police might technically be able to “see” the
contents of user accounts through the cloud-connected software
because of the seized computer, law enforcement must obtain war-
rants for containers “closed against inspection, wherever they may
be.”145 The access gained by searching a suspect’s local computer is
accordingly not a lawful vantage point to view cloud files.
Additionally, searching a suspect’s computer does not put law
enforcement in a position to lawfully seize the data. Cloud storage
has the dual characteristics of being an effect as a virtual closed
container, as well as a separate location, both physical and virtu-
al.146 Recall that commercial cloud storage is remote by nature, and
commercial providers use networked clusters of servers to host
data.147 Such generality violates the Fourth Amendment’s demand
of specificity in places to be searched.148 Not only do cloud servers
occupy a different physical space, but they also represent a different
144. See Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 427 (1981) (plurality opinion) (noting that a
transparent container would not preserve a reasonable expectation of privacy against law
enforcement because such “container[s] proclaim[ ] [their] contents”), overruled on other
grounds by United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 802 (1982).
145. Courtney M. Bowman, Note, A Way Forward After Warshak: Fourth Amendment
Protections for E-Mail, 27 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 809, 811 (2012) (citing Ex parte Jackson, 96
U.S. 727, 733 (1877)).
146. See supra notes 4-12 and accompanying text.
147. See Strickland, supra note 9.
148. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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virtual place.149 Essentially, the police would be going into an entire-
ly new location, one that the warrant gives them no right to go.150
B. Exigent Circumstances
The plain view doctrine is not the only way to sidestep the
warrant requirement. Another long-accepted justification to forgo
a warrant in criminal investigations is when police face exigent cir-
cumstances.151 These are instances when law enforcement’s failure
to obtain a warrant is reasonable given the surrounding events.152
The need to prevent the destruction of evidence is one such recog-
nized circumstance.153
The plain view doctrine, if properly followed and adapted to ad-
vancing technology, would not empower law enforcement to gather
cloud data files through locally installed programs. It would be
difficult for a suspect to remotely delete data on a seized computer
in police custody.154 Still, cloud data is stored on remote servers, and
is accessible on virtually any Internet-capable device.155 It is easy to
149. This situation is not unlike when police have a warrant to search a single building on
a piece of property with multiple structures. If the police want to search a house, they can
search a house. Yet, that same warrant does not necessarily empower them to search the
curtilage or structures on a person’s property, such as a guesthouse. State v. Hamilton, 290
P.3d 271, 275 (N.M. Ct. App. 2012). Ownership of the structure (in this case ownership of the
account) is not enough. United States v. Schroeder, 129 F.3d 439, 442 (8th Cir. 1997). Just
because these places are easily accessible from the lawful vantage point does not make
extending a search equally lawful.
150. It is also quite likely that some of these remote servers might be in a wholly different
jurisdiction than the one that issued the search warrant in the first place. This would pose
problems, as the warrant requirement to search the original computer in one state may be
different than what is necessary for a search in the actual jurisdiction where the cloud drives
are located, at least in terms of state law. See Susan W. Brenner, Law, Dissonance, and
Remote Computer Searches, 14 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 43, 55-60 (2012) (examining the problem of
jurisdiction-straddling computer searches as they apply to searching individual drives).
Although justified at their actual location, the police could indeed be breaking the law at the
source of the information for which they are searching.
151. An exigent circumstance is one that makes law enforcement’s failure to obtain a
warrant reasonable. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 299 (1967).
152. See Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393-94 (1978).
153. Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006); Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 40-41
(1963).
154. All police officers would need to do in most situations is block Internet access and any
remote users would be cut off.
155. See Rouse, supra note 4.
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think that police would fear that data they see on cloud servers
might be destroyed before they can get a warrant to search it. After
all, the suspect could simply go to another computer and delete the
contents.
That fear is not groundless. Access is remote, and as long as a
cloud account holder has Internet access, they have access to the
account and the ability to manage their files. However, the realities
of cloud and computer storage remove any exigency. The risk of
losing the data is small, thus not nearly enough of a concern to
bypass the Fourth Amendment. Even after a user deletes his data
or closes his account, many cloud storage providers will preserve
data on their servers for a period of time.156 There are also storage
providers that do not expressly acknowledge that data will remain
on their servers after a user-initiated deletion.157
Regardless, despite any user attempts to remove data from their
account, exigent circumstances are unlikely to exist. Simply deleting
data from a drive does not completely destroy the files hosted there,
and “deleted” data is actually recoverable.158 Totally eliminating
data requires taking extra steps beyond merely selecting a delete
option. That would require physical access to the hosting drive, such
as smashing it to bits, or expanded logical access likely beyond the
capabilities of an end-user.159
156. See, e.g., Dropbox Privacy Policy, DROPBOX (Feb. 20, 2014), https://www.dropbox.com/
privacy#privacy [http://perma.cc/DT74-78N8]; iCloud Terms and Conditions, APPLE, http://
www.apple.com/legal/Internet-services/icloud/en/terms.html [http://perma.cc/U435-4DTK]
(last updated Oct. 20, 2014); Google Terms of Service, supra note 111; Microsoft Services
Agreement, supra note 112 (outlining the terms of service applying to SkyDrive cloud storage).
157. See, e.g., Mozy Privacy Policy, supra note 113.
158. See How to Permanently Erase Data off a Hard Drive, WIKIHOW, http://www.wikihow.
com/Permanently-Erase-Data-Off-a-Hard-Drive [http://perma.cc/H3EQ-EX6J] (last visited
Apr. 11, 2015) (describing “deleted” data as merely marked for overwrite, unless one takes
further action to fully erase the file).
159. See Josiah Dykstra & Damien Riehl, Forensic Collection of Electronic Evidence from
Infrastructure-as-a-Service Cloud Computing, 19 RICH. J.L. & TECH 1, 12 (2012); Mossberg,
supra note 7.
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IV. A POSSIBLE SOLUTION
The law leans against the police if officers want to use local soft-
ware to gain access to cloud data absent a warrant, but desire to
access such information is understandable. As cloud storage grows
increasingly ubiquitous, it will progressively host more documents
and data of interest to law enforcement. Conceivably, there will be
those who make exclusive use of remote drives to store their data.160
Perhaps the simplest answer is to obtain a warrant for the account
the officers wish to examine.
Nonetheless, this approach presents problems of its own. Many
different companies offer cloud storage services.161 Though warrants
call for specificity in what will be searched, trying to guess what
cloud service a suspect employs prior to searching his computer is
impractical given the many options.162 Numerous cloud providers
exist, and it is difficult to tell beforehand if and what provider a
suspect uses. In reconciling the particularity requirement with the
Internet, courts should address cloud accounts in a manner similar
to what Professor Kerr suggests. He argues that courts should issue
a warrant to search all of a person’s online accounts rather than just
one at time.163 This approach would ensure that police could search
any online accounts linked to a suspect’s computer, but it is more
expansive than it needs to be.
Professor Kerr developed his approach only for searching Internet
communications,164 rather than searching for files stored on the web.
Although e-mail services can act as a vessel for pure communication
and store files through message attachments, accounts and services
160. See Tom Cheredar, Bitcasa Grabs $11M for Its “Infinite” Cloud Storage, VENTUREBEAT
(Nov. 11, 2013, 10:45 AM), http://verturebeat.com/2013/11/11/bitcasa-grabs-11m-for-its-infinite-
cloud-storage/ [http://perma.cc/XA6M-SR6N] (describing how users can have unlimited space
to store their files).
161. See Paul Lilly, Top 20 Cloud Storage Services: The Great Hard Drive in the Sky,
TECHADVISOR (Jan. 22, 2013), http://www.pcadvisor.co.uk/features/storage/3421715/top-20-
cloud-storage-services [http://perma.cc/NYP5-T6CE].
162. Id.
163. Kerr, supra note 16, at 1045-47.
164. Id. at 1045.
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exist that are limited to one or the other.165 Accordingly, for search-
ing cloud storage accounts, courts should take a narrower version of
Kerr’s approach and issue a warrant only for services that can store
data files beyond text-based communication.
Such an approach would better serve the Fourth Amendment’s
particularity requirement than an authorization encompassing all
of a suspect’s online accounts. It is highly unlikely that police
searching for images of child pornography will find such files in the
text log of an online chat program. However, permitting police to
search all accounts attached to an individual enables to them to go
combing through digital locations where evidence of the pertinent
crime cannot, or is highly unlikely to, exist. Limiting a warrant to
storage accounts versus a general warrant166 for all Internet services
would preserve a degree of a suspect’s privacy, while at the same
time enabling police to do their job. Should law enforcement
inadvertently access account information outside the scope of the
warrant, a court can exclude evidence of criminal activity found
therein.
CONCLUSION
The Internet and its boundless capabilities have reshaped society.
The Ninth Circuit aptly calls it the “new frontier” of the Fourth
Amendment, in which the limits of privacy protection are an “open
question.”167 Questions involving cloud computing do require an-
swering and analysis. One thing is clear though: in at least a num-
ber of circumstances, people can retain a reasonable expectation of
privacy in their cloud storage. That expectation is separate and
apart from that which they enjoy in their physical computer. A
warrant authorizing the search of one computer does not destroy
165. See, e.g., Jon Brodkin, Rather Than Recreate Google Drive, Yahoo Integrates Dropbox
into Mail, ARSTECHNICA (Apr. 2, 2013, 7:15 PM), http://arstechnica.com/information-technology/
2013/04/rather-than-recreate-google-drive-yahoo-integrates-dropbox-into-mail/
[http://perma.cc/BJY2-YSKE] (explaining that although users can use Dropbox within Yahoo’s
mail service, the two are separate services because Yahoo elected to partner with Dropbox
rather than develop its own competition to Google).
166. Recall that the Fourth Amendment’s tradition strongly disfavors general warrants.
See MCINNIS, supra note 40, at 15-20.
167. Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., 529 F.3d 892, 904 (9th Cir. 2008) rev’d sub nom.
on other grounds, City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619 (2010).
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expectations of privacy in other computers that communicate with
it. The same applies to cloud accounts that a computer links to, as
they are detached and distinct. The convenience of peering through
locally installed software does nothing to change that. If a police
officer wants to search the data in one of those accounts, as they
wanted to do with the theoretical Winston, they should get a war-
rant.
Aaron J. Gold*
* J.D. Candidate 2015, William & Mary Law School; B.A. 2011, American University. I
would like to thank Professors Jennifer Stevenson and Adam Gershowitz for their helpful
comments and insight. Additionally, many thanks to the editors and staff of the William &
Mary Law Review, in particular Kayla McCann Marty, for their assistance in preparing this
Note for publication.
